There are many types of frauds associated with credit card such as identity theft, application fraud, account takeover, skimming, carding and BIN attack.

The methodology employed in the study was quite straightforward. Simply, it involved conducting file reviews of all cases of clandestine drug labs coming to the attention of police offices in British Columbia (including those of municipal police departments) for the two-year period April 01, 2003 to March 31, 2005. A listing of these cases was provided by RCMP “E” Division Headquarters and included 48 cases associated to 16 jurisdictions. Of these 48 cases, five could be described as dump sites for chemicals from clandestine labs, and four others were associated to locations where chemicals used in clandestine labs were being stored. Further, another six cases were delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction labs, and while these were reviewed, they were excluded from the analysis for this report. Accordingly, the description and analysis provided in this report is based on 33 cases.
This report describes the results of a study undertaken to find out more about synthetic drug production operations, specifically methamphetamine in British Columbia. The study sought to provide a picture of selected characteristics of clandestine synthetic drug labs discovered by police in recent years, giving particular attention to how these labs came to the attention of police and how, as cases, they were investigated, prosecuted, and sentenced. Further, the study sought to describe the nature of these labs and the characteristics of the offenders involved.

The methodology employed in the study was quite straightforward. Simply, it involved conducting file reviews of all cases of clandestine drug labs coming to the attention of police offices in British Columbia (including those of municipal police departments) for the two-year period April 01, 2003 to March 31, 2005. A listing of these cases was provided by RCMP “E” Division Headquarters and included 48 cases associated to 16 jurisdictions. Of these 48 cases, five could be described as dump sites for chemicals from clandestine labs, and four others were associated to locations where chemicals used in clandestine labs were being stored. Further, another six cases were delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction labs, and while these were reviewed, they were excluded from the analysis for this report. Accordingly, the description and analysis provided in this report is based on 33 cases.

This report describes the results of a study undertaken to find out more about synthetic drug production operations, specifically methamphetamine in British Columbia. The study sought to provide a picture of selected characteristics of clandestine synthetic drug labs discovered by police in recent years, giving particular attention to how these labs came to the attention of police and how, as cases, they were investigated, prosecuted, and sentenced. Further, the study sought to describe the nature of these labs and the characteristics of the offenders involved.

The methodology employed in the study was quite straightforward. Simply, it involved conducting file reviews of all cases of clandestine drug labs coming to the attention of police offices in British Columbia (including those of municipal police departments) for the two-year period April 01, 2003 to March 31, 2005. A listing of these cases was provided by RCMP “E” Division Headquarters and included 48 cases associated to 16 jurisdictions. Of these 48 cases, five could be described as dump sites for chemicals from clandestine labs, and four others were associated to locations where chemicals used in clandestine labs were being stored. Further, another six cases were delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction labs, and while these were reviewed, they were excluded from the analysis for this report. Accordingly, the description and analysis provided in this report is based on 33 cases.

On the matter of how these incidents came to the attention of the police, the study found that 23% came to their attention as a result of proactive police investigation. Rather, the vast majority came to the attention of police through a variety of means (e.g. Crime Stoppers, landlords, fire departments, traffic stops, other crimes, and referrals from inspectors, storage locker owners, etc.). Consistent with the fact that the discovery of drug labs is generally not the result of proactive police investigation is file information that revealed that two-thirds of discovered labs were responded to on the same day that they came to the attention of the police.

In terms of the characteristics of discovered labs, the reviews revealed first, that about half of the labs were set up in houses, and another two were set up in apartments. Further, all but two of those residences were rental properties. Other discoveries were made in detached buildings, and in the case of boxed labs, in vehicles. In terms of commercial properties, two were located in storage lockers and one lab was located in a warehouse.
The production capabilities of discovered labs ranged from 50 grams to more than five kilograms – those with a capacity to produce more than five kilograms in a single synthesis often being referred to as “superlabs”. And as it turns out, more than half of both operational and non-operational labs would fit into this “superlab” category.

Notably, but not surprisingly, the level of sophistication apparent with discovered labs appeared to be associated with their production capacity. In 16% of cases, the lab equipment was handmade, and in another 22% of cases the equipment used was a mix of both handmade and professional items. In the remaining 62% of cases, the equipment used had been professionally manufactured.

The police files also provided information about what chemicals were seized at discovered labs, although police themselves caution that this information is not necessarily accurate because empty chemical containers were not always listed, and they could not otherwise always confirm the exact nature of chemicals seized. Still, it is apparent from the broad range of chemicals seized that the final product of labs can be (and is) produced through several different combinations of precursors, reagents, and solvents. Indeed, the flexible nature of recipes that go with producing synthetic drugs allows for the use of many different forms of precursors, reagents, and solvents to be used in production. There are precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are necessary components in drug synthesis, but even then they would not necessarily be identifiable on site at labs because of the fact that drug synthesis occurs in many stages and these chemicals may not be present in pure form. In this regard, it is noteworthy while ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are necessary precursors, among the labs associated to this study; those chemicals were rarely seized.

It is well recognized that clandestine labs pose a multiplicity of dangers to anyone who is around them. Many of the chemicals used are dangerous for one reason or another on their own, but they become even more dangerous once manipulated by amateur chemists working in what are essentially makeshift laboratories (without proper ventilation, temperature controls, and other safeguards). The review of files revealed, for example, that in the case of operational and non-operational labs, leaky containers were present 33% of the time, and burn hazards were present 64% of the time. Not surprisingly, fire was involved in 33% of labs deemed to be operational.

Beyond the risk of fire and explosion, there are also the environmental hazards that go with clandestine labs and the inevitable improper disposal of chemicals and equipment. These hazards are well known, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that the associated clean up is extremely expensive – so expensive in fact that it is conceivable that some landlords (rather than report evidence of a lab) might be motivated to remove evidence from their own property to a dump site so that cleanup costs are forced on others.

Another hazard that can be associated to clandestine labs is the presence of weapons. In this regard, the review revealed that firearms were present at 31% of operational and non-operational labs, and other weapons (e.g. knives) were present 23% of the time.

Suspects were identified in 70% (i.e.23) of the 33 synthetic drug labs considered, and as it turns out, their characteristics are remarkably similar to those of offenders associated to marihuana grow operations in British Columbia. Specifically, the vast majority (87%) is male, the average age is 33, nearly all (96%) are adults, and 71% are Caucasian. The only notable differences between identified suspects associated to synthetic drug labs and marihuana grow operators is with respect to criminal history. Synthetic drug lab operators are far more recidivistic. Specifically, while marihuana grow operators with criminal histories were found to have committed an average of seven convictions over their average 13-year criminal histories, synthetic drug lab suspects were found to have an average of 13 convictions each over their 14-year criminal histories.

In terms of action taken with respect to the 23 labs where suspects were present, just 13 (i.e. 57%) involved charges being laid. The suspects involved were charged under Section 7 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), and in the case of five labs, they were also charged under Section 5 of the CDSA. However, as of the time of writing, charges have been dealt with in only four cases. In one of those four cases, charges were stayed, and in the other three, the suspects involved plead guilty. One suspect received a five-year prison term, one received an 18-month conditional sentence, and another received a 12-month condition sentence and a $1750 fine.

In conclusion, while the small number of cases reviewed by this study makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the nature and extent of clandestine laboratories in British Columbia, the indications are clear that most of the labs that have been discovered recently in the province had a capacity to produce a significant amount of methamphetamine. Further, it is clear that those labs were generally of a makeshift nature and used dangerous chemicals in ways that posed a number of inherent hazards to the health and public safety of communities.

Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the study is the small number of labs uncovered over the period studied, relative to the hundreds of labs discovered annually in jurisdictions across the United States (U.S.). This is disturbing because we know that the level of reported use by high school students in British Columbia appears to be at least twice as high as it is, on average, in the U.S. It suggests that those labs that have been discovered are probably just a fraction of the numbers that really exist.

In any case, it is fair to say that our lack of information about the nature and extent of labs in the province need not hold us back from moving to develop strategies to combat them. A national evaluation in the U.S. found, for example, that simply educating police officers, utility workers, and the community in general about the precursors used in clandestine labs leads to increases in lab discoveries (i.e. McEwen et al., 2003). There have also been notable examples of apparent success in combating labs where jurisdictions have implemented pharmacy rules to control the availability of and access to products that contain precursors (i.e. Oklahoma and Oregon as reported by the Oregon State Police and Oregon Narcotics Enforcement Association, 2005). At the same time, it is very clear that the federal government and provincial/territorial governments across Canada are already actively working on strategies to deal with the problem of clandestine labs. This was obvious from the June 2005 meeting of the Western Ministers of Health, Justice, and Public Safety, where discussions focused on developing responses to the problem of methamphetamines and particularly obvious from their calls for expanded legislation and controls to restrict access to precursors, a greater commitment to the enforcement of precursor controls, increased public education, and harsher penalties for those involved in the production and distribution of methamphetamine. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has established a national working group to assist in developing a national strategic approach to the problems related to methamphetamine and other illicit substances. Further, the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General in British Columbia has designated a senior civil servant to focus specifically on developing a response strategy for the province.

Equally encouraging, there is a wealth of information now available about how other jurisdictions are working to handle concerns related to methamphetamine. In fact, one outstanding starting place to develop a sense of how individual communities might respond to the problem, is the U.S. government’s new website at www.methresources.gov. This site is essentially a comprehensive clearinghouse for information on all aspects related to methamphetamine. Visitors to the site can learn of what various jurisdictions are doing in terms of enforcement, legislative changes, pharmacy rules, meth watch programs, treatment programs, and other response mechanisms and collaborative strategies. At the same time they can be directed to those jurisdictions that have seen dramatic introductions in both methamphetamine labs and methamphetamine use. Importantly, the site also provides links to other very informative sites addressing other drugs of concern and associated issues.

One of the matters that becomes very apparent upon visiting the website is that the picture provided regarding the response to the problem of methamphetamine production and use in the U.S. is helped enormously by the data monitoring and tracking systems in place. Indeed, this makes it relatively easy to obtain a quick snapshot of what works and what does not appear to work across a broad range of jurisdictions. In the final analysis, to enhance and support an effective response Canada requires a similar drug resource website, and a similar annual tracking system in place, to facilitate the provision of multi-jurisdictional analysis and helpful cross -comparisons of intervention strategies.

Introduction
In recent years, law enforcement officials, fire officials, drug treatment specialists, victims, broadcasters, elected officials, and other concerned British Columbians have been calling attention to what appears to be a significant prevalence of methamphetamine use (particularly among young people) in British Columbia. Recent statistics on drug use in high schools would support this expressed concern. For example, a recent Institute for Safe Schools for British Columbia survey of 13,176 high school students from three separate school districts in the province suggests that at least eight percent of high school students used “crystal meth” during the 2004/05 school year (Dow and Waterhouse, 2005). Further, almost all of theses students report having used the drug on school property during the school year, and virtually half of them report using on school property more than once per week (Dow and Waterhouse, 2005). As well, it should be noted that there is an unknown percentage of high school students who have used ecstasy in the last year without knowing that it was likely adulterated with methamphetamine (see for example, Peel et al, 2001; Health Canada, 2004). In any case, the level of admitted use among high school students in British Columbia, as suggested through the Institute for Safe Schools for British Columbia survey, would appear to be higher than the level of use reported by high school students elsewhere in Canada (see for example the report of Nordeste, 2004) and in the United States. In this regard, for instance, the University of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future Study suggests that less than five percent of high school students in the United States have used methamphetamine in the last year (i.e. between 1999 and 2002), and overall the rate of use has actually been declining across grades (as reported in the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Fact Sheet, November 2003). Beyond the incident of use by high school students in British Columbia, the experiences of police interviewed for this report would suggest that alarming numbers of offenders are found to be high on methamphetamine at the time of their arrest.

In some respects the prevalence of methamphetamine is not surprising despite heightened public awareness of its characterization as a very dangerous drug. Firstly, as indicated by the Institute for Safe Schools for British Columbia survey, a significant percentage of those who use methamphetamine tend to use it excessively. Secondly, and according to reports from police, methamphetamine is relatively inexpensive – a single “hit” can be purchased for as little a five dollars, and for as little as twenty dollars a day an addict with a direct connection to a manufacturer can comfortably support a habit.

The reason methamphetamine is so inexpensive is no doubt related primarily to the fact that it is relatively easy, quick and inexpensive to manufacture. In fact, judging by websites that provide recipes on how to “cook up” a batch of the drug, it would seem at first glance that even a lay chemist could pull together the required ingredients and be in production in their own kitchen in a matter of days. In a written submission to an April 2005 U.S. Senate hearing on methamphetamine abuse in the United States, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors cited a report finding that as little as “$80.00 U.S. spent at a pharmacy and hardware store can buy ingredients to make an ounce of methamphetamine worth $1,000.00 U.S.” (NASADAD, 2005). At the same time, it is clear from the highly sophisticated methamphetamine production operations discovered by police that it is possible to manufacture extremely high quantities of the drug at a single location in very short periods of time. According to the U.S. ONDCP Fact Sheet, it is possible to produce “in excess of ten pounds of methamphetamine in a 24-hour period, producing high-purity, low-cost methamphetamine” (. However, it is also clear that we have not had a clear picture of the nature and extent of methamphetamine production in British Columbia. On a national level, and using RCMP figures, we know that the number of methamphetamine labs discovered by the police has grown dramatically (i.e. from two in 1998 to 37 in 2003 as reported by Norteste, 2004), and we have had reports from police drawing attention to a similarly significant increase in British Columbia.

With the above in mind, this report describes the results of a study undertaken to find out more about synthetic drug production operations, specifically methamphetamine in British Columbia. The study sought to provide a picture of selected characteristics of clandestine drug production labs discovered by police in recent years, giving particular attention to how these labs came to the attention of police and how, as cases, they were investigated, prosecuted, and sentenced. Further, the study sought to describe the nature of these labs and the characteristics of the offenders involved.

Methodology
The methodology employed in the study was quite straightforward. Simply, it involved conducting file reviews of all cases of clandestine drug labs coming to the attention of all police offices in British Columbia (including those of municipal police departments) for the two-year period April 01, 2003 to March 31, 2005. A listing of these cases was provided by RCMP “E” Division Headquarters and included 48 cases associated to 16 jurisdictions. Of these 48 cases however, five could be described as dump sites for chemicals from clandestine labs, and four others were associated to locations where chemicals used in clandestine labs were being stored. Further, another six cases were delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction labs, and while these were reviewed, they were excluded from the analysis for this report. Accordingly, the description and analysis provided in this report is based on 33 cases.
In the vast majority of cases, the file reviews were completed through site visits to the police offices of the jurisdictions involved, and in the remainder of the cases (where distance and scheduling made timely site visits impractical) files were sent to and reviewed at RCMP “E” Division Headquarters. The site visits were particularly helpful because, more often than not, they provided the researchers with an opportunity to meet directly with frontline officers who had first-hand experience in clandestine drug lab investigations, and the files being studied.
The file reviews were guided by a coding sheet that sought information on 38 variables (see Appendix A). In addition, suspect information was collected using a 65-item coding sheet (Appendix B), and this was supplemented by the coding of suspects’ criminal histories where there was a record of such through CPIC (Appendix C). This information, with all personal identifiers removed, was entered onto a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) database and merged with the incident data for analysis.

Incidents of Clandestine Synthetic Drug Labs
The file reviews revealed that the 33 clandestine labs discovered by police over the study period were located across 15 jurisdictions around the province. However, as Table 1 shows, ten of those jurisdictions are in the province’s Lower Mainland and this is where the majority of labs (i.e. 24) have been discovered.

Of these 33 actual laboratories, essentially half (i.e. 16) were “operational” – that is, at the time of discovery, they were in the process of “cooking” (synthesis or blending chemical ingredients). Another 10 laboratories were “non-operational” – that is, at the time of their discovery by police, they were “not cooking” but were either set up to cook or it was evident a “cook” had just taken place and the lab was still assembled. The remaining seven labs could be described as “boxed labs” – that is, labs that were in a dismantled state for storage, shipment, or hiding. Five of the non-operational and boxed labs were in transport at the time of their discovery, and overall 29 (i.e. 88%) of the 33 labs discovered were, or had the potential to be, producing drugs at the time of their seizure.
In terms of what these labs were set up to manufacture, 27 were methamphetamine labs, and of these, seven were set up to produce ecstasy that contained methamphetamine as the primary drug. The remaining five labs were set up to manufacture other varieties of ecstasy, including one lab that produced the so-called “date rape” drug GHB.
On the matter of just how these incidents came to the attention of the police, it is interesting to note that just 23% came to their attention as a result of proactive police investigation. Rather, as Table 2 shows, the vast majority came to the attention of police through a variety of means (e.g. Crime Stoppers, landlords, fire departments, traffic stops, other crimes, and referrals from inspectors, storage locker owners, etc.).

Consistent with the fact that the discovery of drug labs is generally not the result of proactive police investigation is file information that revealed that two-thirds of discovered labs (i.e. 66%) were responded to on the same day that they came to the attention of the police.

Characteristics Of Clandestine Synthetic Drug Labs
In terms of the characteristics of discovered labs, the file reviews enabled the researchers to look at the type of facilities these labs were housed in, their production capacity, and their level of sophistication. In this regard, the reviews revealed first, that about half of the labs (i.e. 52%) were set up in houses, and another 6% were set up in apartments. Further, all but two of those residences were rental properties. Other discoveries were made in detached buildings (i.e. 15%), and in the case of boxed labs (i.e.15%), in vehicles. In terms of commercial properties, 6% were located in storage lockers and one lab (i.e.3%) was located in a warehouse.
The production capabilities of discovered labs ranged from 50 grams to more than five kilograms – those with a capacity to produce more than five kilograms in a single synthesis often being referred to as “superlabs”. As Table 3 shows, more than half of both operational and non-operational labs would fit into this “superlab” category. Even one of the boxed labs could be described as being a superlab, although most are obviously smaller (presumably to facilitate their mobility).

Notably, but not surprisingly, the level of sophistication apparent with discovered labs appeared to be associated with their production capacity. In 16% of cases the lab equipment was handmade, and in another 22% of cases the equipment used was a mix of both handmade and professional items. In the remaining 62% of cases, the equipment used had been professionally manufactured.

The police files also provided information about what chemicals were seized at discovered labs, although police themselves caution that this information is not necessarily accurate because empty chemical containers were not always listed, and they could not otherwise always confirm the exact nature of chemicals seized. Still, it is apparent from the broad range of chemicals seized that the final product of labs can be (and is) produced through several different combinations of precursors, reagents, and solvents. Indeed, the flexible nature of recipes that go with producing synthetic drugs allows for the use of many different forms of precursors, reagents, and solvents to be used in production. There are precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are necessary components in drug synthesis, but even then, they would not necessarily be identifiable on site at labs because of the fact that drug synthesis occurs in many stages and these chemicals may not be present in pure form. In this regard, it is noteworthy while ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are necessary precursors, among the labs associated to this study; those chemicals were rarely seized.

Hazards Associated To Seized labs
It is well recognized that clandestine labs pose a multiplicity of dangers to anyone who is around them. Many of the chemicals used are dangerous for one reason or another on their own, but they become even more dangerous once manipulated by amateur chemists working in what are essentially makeshift laboratories (without proper ventilation, temperature controls and other safeguards). The review of files revealed, for example, that in the case of operational and non-operational labs, leaky containers were present 33% of the time, and burn hazards were present 64% of the time. Not surprisingly, fire was involved in 33% of labs deemed to be operational.
Beyond the risk of fire and explosion, there are also the environmental hazards associated with clandestine labs and the inevitable improper disposal of chemicals and equipment. To quote again the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy:
“ The manufacture of methamphetamine has a severe impact on the
environment. The production of one pound of methamphetamine
releases poisonous gas into the atmosphere and creates 5 to 7 pounds
of toxic waste. Many laboratory operators dump the toxic waste down
household drains, in fields and yards, or on rural roads.”
(ONDCP Fact Sheet, November 2003)
These hazards are well known, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that the associated clean up is extremely expensive – so expensive in fact that it is conceivable that some landlords (rather than report evidence of a lab) might be motivated to remove evidence from their own property to a dump site so that cleanup costs are forced on others.
Another hazard that can be associated to clandestine labs is the presence of weapons. In this regard, the review revealed that firearms were present at 31% of operational and non-operational labs, and other weapons (e.g. knives) were present 23% of the time.

Suspects Involved
Suspects were identified in 70% (i.e.23) of the 33 synthetic drug labs considered, and as it turns out, their characteristics are remarkably similar to those of offenders associated to marihuana grow operations in British Columbia. Specifically, as Table 6 shows, the vast majority (87%) are male, the average age is 33, nearly all (96%) are adults, and 71% are Caucasian. The only notable differences between identified suspects associated to synthetic drug labs and marihuana grow operators is with respect to criminal history. On the one hand, as with marihuana grow operators, nearly half (47%) have at least one conviction. On the other hand, as can be seen from Table 7, synthetic drug lab operators are far more recidivistic. Specifically, while marihuana grow operators with criminal histories were found to have committed an average of seven convictions over their average 13-year criminal histories, synthetic drug lab suspects were found to have an average of 13 convictions each over their 14-year criminal histories.

Action Taken
In terms of action taken with respect to the 23 labs where suspects were present, just 13 (i.e. 57%) involved charges being laid. The suspects involved were charged under Section 7 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), and in the case of five labs, they were also charged under Section 5 of the CDSA. However, as of the time of writing, charges have been dealt with in only four cases. In one of those four cases, charges were stayed, and in the other three, the suspects involved plead guilty. One suspect received a five-year prison term, one received an 18-month conditional sentence, and another received a 12-month condition sentence and a $1750 fine.

Summary and Recommendations
While the small number of cases reviewed by this study makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the nature and extent of clandestine laboratories in British Columbia, the indications are clear that most of the labs that have been discovered recently in the province had a capacity to produce a significant amount of methamphetamine. Further, it is clear that those labs were generally of a makeshift nature and used dangerous chemicals in ways that posed a number of inherent hazards to public safety. Not surprisingly, labs were, on average, operated by individuals with lengthy criminal histories.
Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the study is the small number of labs uncovered over the period studied, relative to the hundreds of labs discovered annually in jurisdictions across the United States. This is disturbing because we know that the level of reported use by high school students in British Columbia appears to be at least twice as high as it is, on average, in the U.S. It suggests that those labs that have been discovered are probably just a fraction of the numbers that really exist.

In any case, it is fair to say that our lack of information about the nature and extent of labs in the province need not hold us back from moving to develop strategies to combat them. A national evaluation in the U.S. found, for example, that simply educating police officers, utility workers, and the community in general about the precursor used in clandestine labs leads to increases in lab discoveries (McEwen et al., 2003). There have also been notable examples of apparent success in combating labs where jurisdictions have implemented pharmacy rules to control the availability of and access to precursors (i.e. Oklahoma and Oregon as reported by the Oregon State Police and Oregon Narcotics Enforcement Association, 2005). At the same time, it is very clear that the federal government and provincial/territorial governments across Canada are already actively working on strategies to deal with the problem of clandestine labs. This was obvious from the June 2005 meeting of the Western Ministers of Health, Justice, and Public Safety, where discussions focused on developing responses to the problem of methamphetamines and particularly obvious from their calls for expanded legislation and controls to restrict access to precursors, a greater commitment to the enforcement of precursor controls, more public education, and harsher penalties for those involved in meth production and distribution. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has established a national working group to assist in developing a national strategic approach to the problem. Further, the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General in British Columbia has designated a senior civil servant to focus specifically on developing a response strategy for the province.

Equally encouraging, there is a wealth of information now available about how other jurisdictions are working to handle the problem. In fact, one outstanding starting place to develop a sense of how individual communities might respond to the problem, is the U.S. government’s new website at www.methresources.gov. This site is essentially a comprehensive clearinghouse for information on all aspects of the methamphetamine problem. Visitors to the site can learn of what various jurisdictions are doing in terms of enforcement, legislative changes, pharmacy rules, meth watch programs, treatment programs, and other response mechanisms and collaborative strategies. At the same time they can be directed to those jurisdictions that have seen dramatic introductions in both meth labs and meth use. Importantly, the site also lists links to other very informative sites addressing other drugs and associated issues.

One of the matters that becomes very apparent upon visiting the website is that the picture provided regarding the response to the problem of meth production and use in the U.S. is helped enormously by the data monitoring and tracking systems in place there. Indeed, this makes it relatively easy to get a quick snapshot of what works and what does not appear to work across a broad range of jurisdictions. In the final analysis, Canada really needs a similar drug resource website, and a similar annual tracking system in place, to facilitate the provision of multi-jurisdictional analysis and helpful cross -comparisons of intervention strategies.

Introduction
This costing of police services is an activity-time costing in which baseline line estimates of demand for police services, the steps required to handle a call and the time taken in responding to a call were researched for current operations and operations 10, 20 and 30 years ago. This approach provides estimates of changing levels of police capacity and, in periods of fixed resources, provides the basis for comparing expenditures over a fixed period.
Police services in British Columbia have traditionally been staffed and funded according to a formula grounded in part on provincial population. As the province has grown over the past three decades, so have the numbers of sworn police officers and their civilian support staff increased. Accordingly, policing expenditures have also increased.
This fact – that both police expenditures and the number of police officers and civilian support staff has grown as British Columbia’s population has grown – seems to stand in stark contrast to public concerns for the safety of both person and property in the province and to the concerns of senior police managers, who believe that there has been a substantial erosion in their capacity to respond to crime and calls for service over this same time period.
This perceived erosion of police capacity to respond to crime is reflected in many aspects of police service delivery. Crime clearance rates have declined substantially. Police forces and detachments have become far more selective about the crime reports to which they physically attend and about which crimes they will fully investigate. Anecdotally, we can point to one police agency that was recently forced to consider abandoning a homicide investigation because of the costs involved and to a police force in another city in which a six-figure fraud investigation was shelved because the losses involved were not considered big enough to justify the cost of investigation and prosecution support. It appears that increasing numbers of impaired drivers are being given 24 hour suspensions rather than being charged and increasing numbers of drug cases end with contraband seizures rather than charges. Moreover private security personnel still outnumber public police in Canada and have begun to act in matters such as investigating corporate fraud, preventing computer crime and conducting forensic analyses that have traditionally been done by public police.
At least part of the explanation for the current situation of increased police resources and declining police service can be found – in British Columbia at least – in a series of less visible changes in the relative position of police forces in relation to the crime burden and in the increasing complexity of the police job. Legislation and court rulings have resulted in increases in required steps in handling cases with associated increases in time for complete cases. Technical advancements and additions of computer systems may have increased some administrative work. For example, a DUI case or a domestic assault of 30 years ago is decidedly different, with current cases requiring substantial longer police time. Police case capacity is decreasing.
This CCJR Research Summary Report condenses and highlights the findings in an associated technical report.

Research Strategy
Discussion with senior police managers, NCO’s and front line officers confirmed our initial assumption that there was a general feeling amongst police in British Columbia that they were working harder than they had in the past, but doing so less effectively. Further discussions supplemented by a systematic literature review suggested two likely reality-based explanations for this general feeling:
• Police resources allocated on the basis of residential population are inadequate to the tasks police are expected to accomplish.
• Changes in the legal and technical context in which police must operate have made the job more complex and therefore much more time consuming than in the past.
The implications of these two issues for understanding contemporary police resourcing needs are profound. To the extent that the first explanation is correct, too few police are available to do the job. To the extent that the second explanation is correct, those police who have been resourced have far less capacity to handle crimes and other calls for service than did police working 10, 20 or 30 years ago.
We addressed these issues in a series of interconnected ways. The first issue could be addressed by looking at BC police resources in comparison with other Canadian, Commonwealth, and Common Law jurisdictions and further examining BC police resourcing in relation to BC population and BC crime over time.
Addressing the second issue required examination of the evolving legal and technical requirements of the job over time and the development of police work process models describing the step-by-step handling of a variety of crimes both at the present time and in prior decades. We looked at things 10, 20 and 30 years ago for three different areas centered on – Surrey, Nanaimo, and Prince George – representing three different regions of the province.
We gathered information through:
• An analysis of case law and legislation touching on the police function over the period 1970 – 2004.
• Expert Focus Groups with long term service helped develop flow charts depicting the steps involved in handling different types of cases – break and enter, domestic assault, driving under the influence, drug trafficking, homicide – at present and 10, 20 and 30 years ago. They provided their own notebooks for historical analysis. They also helped us develop a time line depicting the technological changes that have influenced policing since 1970.
• Regional Focus Groups in the three study cities helped refine the crime handling flow charts from local perspectives and also helped provide timing data for understanding how long each step in the process takes currently and 10, 20 and 30 years ago. They provided their own logbooks for historical analysis.
• Analysis of historical operational records including case files and members’ notebooks provided additional information for the flow charts and time estimates.
• A sample of members kept current time use logs, recording the time spent on various tasks as they handled cases involving the five types of crime under study. Analysis of these logs gave current estimates of the amounts of time needed to complete the different tasks need to carry the case to conclusion.
• An analysis of data derived from CAD and CIIDS was intended to supplement and refine the timing models developed from the sources mentioned above. A variety of obstacles have precluded our accessing these data to this project to date. This report will be supplemented when these data become available.
Finally, we utilized the information developed in this study to prototype a simple tool for estimating the impact of changing case handling times as the British Columbia policing context continues to evolve.
At the same time, it will be important to keep in mind that there are multiplicity of work and attendant costs associated to policing that this study did not take into account – but it is widely recognized by those familiar with policing services that such work and costs have increased dramatically over the years. These cost include, for example, added training requirements related to increased accountability and liability issues respecting such matters as use of force, emergency vehicle operation, handling of domestic violence cases, harassment prevention, labor code changes, and emergency preparedness. As well there are the added training that has become necessary as a consequence of the increasing complexity involved in investigations, legal matters in general, the globalization of crime, and crimes involving ever changing technology. Further, there have been ever increasing equipment, training, testing, and legal costs associated to general health and personnel matters. Overall, every year, the requirement of police agencies to deal with new aspects of these issues adds millions of dollars to the costs over previous years.

Overview of the British Columbia Policing Context
Canada is a relatively high crime nation. International victimization surveys and international compilations of crimes known to the police both indicate that Canada has high property crime levels and high assault levels relative to other developed nations. About one Canadian in four (25% of the population) is victimized each year by one of the 11 types of crime tracked by the International Victimization Survey. Canada has traditionally also been relatively lightly policed in comparison to other developed nations such as Australia, Britain, France, Ireland, Netherlands or the United States having far fewer police per capita than any of them. For instance in 2003, Canada’s ratio of police to population was 19% lower than Australia’s, 22% lower than that of the United States and 26% lower than that of England and Wales. Within Canada, British Columbia is traditionally lightly policed compared to other provinces although it has consistently had among the highest provincial crime rates since at least the 1920’s. In 2004, for instance British Columbia had more criminal code offences reported to the police than Quebec, although Quebec had almost double BC’s population. British Columbia’s crime rate was more than double that of Ontario. Yet Ontario and Quebec both had substantially more police per capita than British Columbia, which had lower police to population ratios than relatively low crime Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
British Columbia, like the rest of Canada, estimates the number of police it needs on the basis population counts. Population in Canada more than doubled (2.3 times) between 1962 and 2003 while the number of police increased by only 1.7 times – falling behind what might be assumed to be needed if population were the best indicator of policing needs. The number of crimes reported to the police in Canada over this same time period increased seven fold. British Columbia’s data tell a similar story: population more than doubled (2.4 times) between 1962 and 2003, but the number of crimes reported to the police increased seven-fold. This means that although the increase in police resources kept pace with population growth over this forty-year period, each British Columbia police officer was expected to handle almost three times as many crimes in 2005 as his or her 1962 peer had been expected to handle. Police resources did not keep pace with the volume of crime British Columbians suffered. All things being equal, this fact alone indicates that police effectiveness must have declined relative to police effectiveness a generation ago. Over this time police clearance rates have declined substantially. Break and Enter clearances have dropped from around 25% to around 8%; homicide clearance rates have dropped from around 90% to below 70%. British Columbia spends less per capita for police services than Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. British Columbia has 13% of Canada’s population and 20% of Canada’s criminal code offences, but accounts for only 10% Canada’s spending for police services.
It appears that the answer to the first issue posed in this study is that police resources are funded more on the basis of residential population resulting in an insufficient quantity of police resources to accomplish the tasks police are expected to accomplish. Police resources funded on the basis of crime volumes could provide an increase in capacity that could better address the province’s crime problems.

The Evolving Technical and Legal Environment
Technological Impacts
The R.C.M.P. in British Columbia have seen a number of technological impacts in the past three decades. The major technological influences are:
1. Computer aided dispatch
2. Records management system
3. Radio communications
4. Mobile workstations

New technology provides new and better systems for communication, dispatch, crime analysis, case management, prosecution support, and force administration and management. New technology also makes demands on members’ time in terms of training and re-training in its use and in terms of connecting with and waiting for technical support when problems develop and glitches occur. There is another problem as well. New technical tools can be seductive, inviting members to spend more time working with the technology (polishing the text of reports or printing better looking
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graphs, for instance) rather than working cases or implementing special projects. Improved technology often carries with it demands from others in the criminal justice system for new and increasingly time consuming activities on the part of police officers. As the diagram above indicates, a limited number of major technical advances in the 1970’s and 1980’s have been followed by an accelerating introduction of new technical hardware and systems in the 1990’s and in the new century. The need for training and re-training in the use of technical systems is accelerating.
It should be noted that the introduction of technology in policing follows a path similar to the technology changes in government in general and in business as well. The increased technology provides the potential improving the availability of information, but for most has an associated increase in administrative work.
The time consuming use of these new technical systems continues to grow. This is illustrated in the amount of time members now put into administrative duties and report writing compared to the past. In the 1970’s such tasks took a typical member about an hour and a half per day. Currently the typical member spends more than four hours a day, that is, about 40% of his or her time, at administrative duties and report writing. In addition, both our experts focus groups and our study of the daily time logs members kept for this study indicated that many members are putting in up to an hour of unpaid overtime every day to get through all the required paperwork. Study of the daily time logs members kept for this project indicates that general duty members spend more time on paperwork tasks than they spend on responding to calls for service and conducting investigations combined. They also told us that the introduction of mobile data terminals has made it possible to do paperwork in their police vehicles and estimated that some 80% of their time on patrol when not actively responding to calls is spent doing paperwork over the mobile data terminals.

The Impact of the Evolving Legal Context of Policing
The patterns and requirements of police work are defined by law and are continually redefined by new judicial decisions, new legislation, and new government policy initiatives. Since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has moved to redefine substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law in line with its requirements. As a consequence, demands on police operations have increased dramatically without a proportional increase in budget or person-power. In turn, these demands have had a significant workload affect on police organizations and their ability to serve the public.
Using the Charter as the starting point, there were four key steps taken in identifying some of the most significant judicial decisions, legislative changes and policy initiatives impacting on current police capabilities:
• Step one was a review of criminal law literature to identify the most frequently cited cases dealing with matters of criminal procedure and evidence (cross referenced to legislation and policy.
• The second step was to hold focus groups with a cross section of officers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), where they were asked to identify the most significant judicial decisions, legislative changes, and policy initiatives that have affected police operations (especially in British Columbia) in the last thirty years.
• The third step was to consult experts in the field of law and policing, including experienced police officers with law degrees (and/or who practiced law), Crown prosecutors, and lawyers in private practice.
• The fourth step involved establishment of a consensus list (based on steps one through three) of the judicial decisions, legislative changes and policy of greatest impact on police operations.
There was absolute agreement that the Charter has had the greatest effect on police operations and investigative practice in the history of Canadian policing.1 Among judicial decisions, there was similar concurrence that judicially prescribed disclosure rules (see R. v. Stinchcombe2) have probably had the most profound effect on policing in terms of workload and economic cost.

Task Timing for Specific Crimes

In seeking to understand the time-activity cost of changes in police work over time, the project constructed detailed step-by-step flow charts of the handling of five kinds of crimes, from the time they come to the attention of the police until the time they are handed off to Crown Counsel in the form of a recommendation for charge. The objective of creating the flow charts is to produce a visual ‘walk through’ of an investigation in order to attach a range or estimate of timing associated with each step. The charts also indicate the evolution of the policing function by making it easy to see the addition or subtraction of steps over the course of time. The project examined detailed flow charts of the handling of homicides, break and enters, domestic assaults, driving under the influence cases, and drug trafficking cases 30 years ago, 20 years ago, 10 years ago, and at the present time. The flow charts were constructed during the Expert Focus Groups (EFG) through contributions from the senior members in attendance. These flow charts represent the entire catalog of steps and outcome categories that may be taken during an investigation of the five offence types in question. Exact flows may vary depending on the specifics of individual cases, but the general trend line for all five crime types has been a steady increase in the number of different steps and categories that must be taken to handle it from discovery to charge recommendation. Note that the number of procedural steps and outcome categories needed to handle a case increased for all five crimes, though for break and enters the increase was about 22% and for homicide about 25% over the 30-year period. The number of steps needed to handle a DUI case increased 45%. The number of steps needed to handle a domestic assault increased 61% with the big shift coming between 10 and 20 years ago. The complexity of drug trafficking cases has increased at a stunning pace, expanding 722% over the 30 years.
To illustrate the expansion we include the Drug Trafficking flow chart from 30 years ago and the current Drug Trafficking flow chart below. Charts for intervening years and for the other offences are included in the full technical report.
These flow charts formed the basis for estimating the time budgets, that is, the quantity of an officer’s work time, in minutes and hours that would be necessary to handle a typical case in each crime category 30 years ago, 20 years ago, 10 years ago and at the current time. These time estimates are for members’ time only. They do not include time estimates for other parts of the system or for technical or administrative support. We were able to estimate handling times for three of the crime types under study – break and enters, domestic assaults and DUI’s — through discussions in the Expert Focus Groups and Regional Focus Groups and through examination of some other documentary resources. When CAD/CIIDS data become available we may be able to expand our time estimates to cover homicide and drug trafficking as well. It is clear from this table that the amount of time it takes a police officer to handle one of these cases has expanded in all three crime types: about 40 percent at the upper end in the case of break and enter cases; five fold in the case of DUI’s; between ten and twelve fold in the case of domestic assaults. Note also, that these are estimates for a single police officer attending. In the case of domestic assaults it is now typical for multiple officers to be on scene and involved in handling the case.

Conclusion
Policing has experienced a significant increase in demand for services over the last 30 years. The demand has far outstripped increases in the number of police – increases that more closely follow increases in population. At the same time British Columbia consistently falls behind the other Provinces in its ratio of police to population.
The divergence between the quantity of police resources in British Columbia and amount of crime to be policed is exacerbated when police capacity is considered. The amount of time needed to handle a case from call for service to acceptance by Crown has increased from a low of around 60% for B&E’s to a high of almost 1,000% for domestic assault. There are clear legal rulings and legislative changes that are forcing much of this increase (without providing for increased resources), but there appear to be other increases in administrative work as well.
Of particular interest is the major increase in the time to prepare a case for Crown and to work with Crown towards actually laying charges. This time has increased substantially and is worth additional research to separate the legal, from the administrative and communication issues involved.
Similarly, it would be of particular importance to explore in more detail the decrease in offences cleared by charge to directly assess whether this is tied to reduced police capacity.